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Tax Aspects of Intellectual Property
Lawrence R. Bloomenthal*
C REATIVE ACTIVITY in the scientific, technical, literary, musical
and artistic fields is encouraged by preferential treatment
under the income tax laws. While musicians, authors, composers
and inventors all receive some special tax benefits, inventors are
awarded the most valuable tax breaks.
Amateur Authors
Since 1950 the income tax laws have discriminated against
amateur or "non-professional" creative work in the fields of
music, art and literature. This was due, in part, to the publica-
tion by General Dwight D. Eisenhower of his war memoirs,
Crusade in Europe. Asserting that the manuscript was the work
of an amateur author, his publishers obtained a revenue ruling
upholding taxation of the entire proceeds of approximately
$1,000,000 as capital gain.'
After considerable critical publicity, Congress amended the
Revenue Code of 1939 so as to exclude copyrights as well as
literary music and artistic works from the definition of capital
assets. Consequently, amateurs now receive the same tax treat-
ment as professionals: neither of them can obtain capital gains
on the sale of their work. The Internal Revenue Code of 1954
adopted these rules without change so that, to this day, there is
continuing discrimination in these fields.2
Capital Gains for Inventors
In direct contrast, Sec. 1235 of the 1954 Code automatically
grants long-term capital gains status to the proceeds realized by
an inventor upon transfer of all substantial rights to a patent.
No distinction is made between amateurs or professionals and it
is unnecessary for the property to be held for six months before
the date of sale, as is usually necessary to qualify for long-term
capital gains. Also, payments can be made contingent on the
productivity, use or disposition of the property transferred. It
is permissible to provide for payments over a period ending with
the transferee's use of the patent.
* Of the Ohio, Iowa and Illinois Bars, U. S. Treas. Dept., I. R. S., Office of
Chief Counsel, Washington, D. C., 1940-41; Trial Attorney and Assistant
Counsel, Office of Chief Counsel, Cleveland, Ohio 1941-50; Private practice
tax attorney, since 1950; Accounting faculty, Fenn College, 1950-52; member,
Tax Section, Amer. Bar Assn.; etc.
1 A review of the events leading to the 1950 amendment appears in the
September, 1958 issue of Journal of Taxation, pp. 140, 142. See also, Taylor,
Tax Relief for Income Attributable to Several Years, 36 Taxes, 701 (1958).
2 Sec. 1221 (3), I. R. C. 1954 excludes copyrights, etc. from definition of
capital asset; Sec. 1231 (c) excludes copyrights, etc. from depreciable prop-
erty capital assets.
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Substantial Rights
The nature or extent of the rights which must be transferred
is not expressly defined in Sec. 1235. Litigation on this point
usually involves the question of whether the inventor has re-
tained more control over the manufacture, use and sale of the
patented device or product than is necessary for his own pro-
tection.
In the case of Arthur M. Young,3 the Tax Court ruled that
there was no transfer of all substantial rights to the patents on
certain helicopter improvements, because the inventor had re-
tained the right to terminate the transfer at any time and for any
reason. The Tax Court refused to accept the taxpayer's argument
that termination was highly unlikely because Young then would
not recoup anything of substantial value.
Agreeing with the Commissioner, the Tax Court pointed
out that there was a distinct advantage to Young if he should
terminate, because he would then have the sole right to sue in
his own name for patent infringement and this right could be of
great economic value. He could then make other assignments
which might produce greater royalties than he was receiving
under the original agreement with Bell Aviation Corporation.
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals has affirmed this decision.4
Cancellation Privileges
Does retention of the right to cancel a patent assignment
for failure to produce or market a specified quantity of the pat-
ented items disqualify the inventor from the benefits of capital
gains? In Golconda Corp. v. Commissioner,5 the reservation of
cancellation rights was held to be immaterial so long as the
assignment prohibited the inventor from making, using or sell-
ing the patented item anywhere within fixed territorial limits.
This case also established that it is permissible for the inventor
to retain termination power if production falls below a specified
quantity. Here, the restriction was that the assignment of patents
to diamond saw teeth could be cancelled if production was less
than 80% of the transferee's entire business in diamond variety
saw teeth.
Unlimited sublicenses or assignments by the transferee may
be restricted by the inventor without jeopardizing his taxable
status for capital gains purposes.6
3 29 T. C. 850 (1958), affd., (2d Cir. 1959) 59-2 U. S. T. C. Par. 9589.
4 Supra note 3.
5 29 T. C. 506, (Acq.) (1957); Orla E. Watson v. U. S. 222 F. 2d 689 (10th
Cir. 1955). (Failure to make 2600 collapsible grocery carts in six months
period).
6 Carroll Pressure Roller Corp. 28 T. C. 1288 (1957), app. dism. by stip.;
Rev. Ruling 58-353. I. R. B. 1958 29, 15.
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Geographical Limitations
Restrictions can be imposed by the inventor on the manu-
facture, sale and use of patented items outside of a specified
geographical area and still permit him to claim the tax advan-
tages under Sec. 1235. An exclusive assignment also can limit use
of the transferred patents to a single industry, such as tuna
canning, especially when that is the only industry in which the
particular rights have any real value.
7
Splitting Single Patents
An unusual situation arose in a case in which the Merck
Drug Company was claiming an income tax refund of more than
$300,000.00 on the theory that it had erroneously reported in-
come from transfer of certain patent rights as ordinary income
rather than as capital gains. Merck and Company owned a single
patent which covered a number of separate inventions on the
chemical compounds commonly known as the sulfa drug.
By an exclusive license agreement, the complete rights to
sulfadiazine were transferred to another company. The govern-
ment argued that an assignment of less than all of the rights
covered by a single patent, or an undivided interest in all such
rights, did not constitute a sale. Consequently, the assignment
must be treated as a license resulting in ordinary income.
The District Court, however, disagreed, and decided in favor
of the plaintiff.8 In its opinion, the Court stated that all of the
rights pertaining to a particular portion of a single patent had
been transferred and that this was sufficient to qualify the pro-
ceeds as long-term capital gains. While this decision involved
years before Sec. 1235 became effective, the same results would
follow under the present statute.
Product Limitations
In the case of First National Bank of Princeton v. United
States,9 the use of assigned patent rights was limited to the man-
ufacture and sale of toothbrushes even though the patented
device was broad enough to cover almost every other kind of
brush. It was held that product limitations did not interfere with
a complete transfer of all substantial rights.
7 Eben H. Carruthers, 219 F. 2d 21 (1st Cir. 1955); R. H. Crook 135 F. Supp.
242 (1955).
8 Merck & Co., Inc. 155 F. Supp. 843, (1957) affd. 261 F. 2d 162, (3d Cir.
1959) cert. not authorized. Revenue Ruling 59-175, I. R. B. 1959-20, 13 holds
that a transfer of an undivided one-half interest or other transfer of a com-
plete fraction of a whole patent complies with Sec. 1235, I. R. C. 1954.
9 136 F. Supp. 818, (1956), app. dism.
3Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1960
TAXES ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
Sales Price Veto
In another case, Arras v. United States,10 the inventor of
an automobile hose clamp retained the power to set sales price
levels, subject to adjustment to meet competition. There were a
number of other reserved powers which the Commissioner con-
ceded would not necessarily prevent the transfer from compli-
ance with the requirements of Sec. 1235.
The agreement stated that the purchaser was acquiring ex-
clusive rights for the manufacture, sale and use of the device
covered by the patent. However, Arras retained legal title, a
veto over sub-licensing, the right to check the books of the
transferee, an option to cancel if the patent were shelved, a
right to terminate for breach and a duty to defend against in-
fringement.
The District Court of Connecticut stated that no single one
of these powers considered individually would necessarily pre-
vent the transaction from qualifying as a complete transfer.
Upon consideration of all the facts, it was decided that the com-
bination of reserved rights did not add up to the reservation of
too many substantial powers, since Arras had completely sur-
rendered all rights to exploit the patent himself.
Right to Sell
The usual rule in patent law cases is that an assignee of a
patent has no right to sue in his own name for infringement
unless he has been granted the exclusive privilege to use the
patent for a term of 17 years and to make and sell the articles or
devices throughout the United States and its territories. The
problem under Sec. 1235 is whether there can be a transfer of
"all substantial rights" unless the agreement specifically includes
exclusive rights to make, use and sell.
The Tax Court has followed the rules of patent law quite
literally and has ruled in one case" that there is no transfer of
all substantial rights unless the inventor has conveyed the ex-
clusive right to "make, use and sell" the invention. Any assign-
ment or transfer lacking one of these elements interferes with a
complete transfer, and capital gains would not be available
under Sec. 1235.
However, in the Lawrence case, 12 decided by the Fifth Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals in 1957, it was held that the right to sell
need not be included in express language unless this is a sub-
stantial or valuable right in itself. The Lawrence case involved
the transfer of rights to a device for removing pipe and other
obstructions from oil wells. Despite the Government's contention
that the right to sell was a necessary qualification under Sec.
1235, the Court of Appeals decided that neither party considered
10 164 F. Supp. 150 (D. C. Conn. 1958).
11 Arthur B. Young, supra note 3.
12 Richard R. Lawrence v. U. S., 242 F. 2d 542 (5th Cir. 1957).
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the sale of the tools advisable because of their highly specialized
nature, requiring skilled operators. Consequently, to prevent
injury to the reputation of the tool and to prevent damage to oil
wells, the parties agreed that the transferee should lease rather
than sell these tools.
Right to Use
In the Gruber case,13 the Government contended that there
had not been a complete transfer because the agreement failed
to confer an unlimited right to use the patent in addition to the
right to manufacture and sell the "View-Master," a device for
viewing stereoscopic slides. The District Court in Oregon
pointed out that the Government had failed to prove that the
right to use had any substantial value by itself. The valuable
rights were for manufacture and sale so that the right to "use"
the device was automatically granted by the right to manufac-
ture and sell.
Too Many Rights
Occasionally, an inventor will retain too many rights and
thereby deprive himself of capital gains. In James R. Watkins v.
United States14 Watkins retained six privileges, which the Ap-
pellate Court decided gave him so many rights and interests,
both present and future, that there was much less than a com-
plete transfer.
An especially objectionable feature of the arrangement was
that the grantee received a "non-transferable exclusive license
for the use of" the various patents. Watkins explained that his
intention was to confer manufacturing and selling rights by al-
lowing the grantee to use the patents, and argued that all the
other retained interests were merely incidental and did not af-
fect the transfer of all substantial rights. The Court upheld the
Commissioner in taxing the proceeds as ordinary income.
The Court suggested that a complete transfer in good faith
could have been accomplished in simple language, in a single
agreement, rather than by the execution of five highly technical
contracts. It was apparent to the Court that Watkins was at-
tempting to secure maximum tax advantages while, at the same
time, retaining as many rights as possible.
Rights of Employees
Does an inventor have any "substantial rights" in an inven-
tion or patents which he has perfected while a full time em-
ployee? Under the rules of patent law, an employer has "shop
rights" consisting of a non-exclusive right to practice or exploit
any invention developed by an employee during his hours of
13 Win. B. Gruber v. U. S., 158 F. Supp. 5 (D. C. Ore. 1958) taxpayer ap-
peal pending to C. A. 9 on another issue. See also; E. E. Rollman, 244 F. 2d
634 (4th Cir. 1957); National Bread Wrapping Machine, 30 T. C. 550 (1958).
14 252 F. 2d 722 (2d Cir. 1958); cert. den., 78 S. Ct. 1384.
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employment while working with the employer's tools and ma-
terials. In the case of Hans Jordan15 the Commissioner contended
that the entire proceeds realized by Jordan, an electrical engi-
neer, from the transfer to his employer of his full right, title
and interest in a patent on a waste disposal unit was compen-
sation for services taxable at ordinary rates. Judge Rice, speak-
ing for the Tax Court, sustained the petitioner, holding that
Jordan possessed substantial rights even though the employer
had shop rights. There was no dispute about the fact that
Jordan's employer had supplied material and working facilities,
or that the work was done on the employer's time and with the
assistance of fellow employees. Nevertheless, since patent law
rules permit the employee to license to other manufacturers
or even sell his entire interest, subject to the employer's "shop
rights," Jordan still had many valuable rights. Therefore, he was
entitled to report the proceeds from their disposition as capital
gains.
Sometimes an employer and employee may agree upon a
plan for the joint development of patentable inventions. This is
not covered by Sec. 1235 because there is no transfer of "rights
to an invention" to the employer. In the Kleinschmidt case, 16
a mechanical engineer who was an authority in the field of
thermodynamics was told by his employer that the Marine
Corps was seeking a device for distilling sea water that would
be economical and easy to handle. Kleinschmidt divided his
time between teaching and acting as an engineering consultant.
He was certain he could solve the problem but felt that he could
not afford to devote the time required to exploit the device
without financial backing. After preliminary work was com-
pleted and while a patent application was pending, the invention
was transferred to the employer. Their agreement gave Klein-
schmidt one-third of all royalties; he agreed to spend whatever
time was required to perfect the invention while the employer
assumed costs of presenting patent applications and sales ex-
penses. It was decided by the District Court that the arrange-
ment was a joint venture with the employer rather than a sale
or transfer of patent rights. Accordingly, all royalties received
were taxable as ordinary income and not as capital gains.
Limitation of Benefits
To prevent abuse of the special tax benefits granted by Sec.
1235, the statute limits automatic capital gains -to individual
inventors and other designated persons. Sec. 1235 (b) specifies
that a "holder" by whom a transfer will qualify includes only
an individual whose efforts created the invention or any other
15 27 T. C. 265, Acq. 1957-1CB4.
16 146 F. Supp. 253 (D. C. Mass. 1956); taxpayer's appeal pending in C. A.
1 (both parties were found to have assumed sharing of risks as well as
profits so as to have character of a joint venture).
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individual who acquired his interest for valuable consideration
prior to actual reduction to practice of such invention. However,
an employer or persons "related" to the inventor, within the
meaning of the statute, cannot automatically receive capital
gain under Sec. 1235 upon transfer of an invention acquired
from the inventor. Related "persons" include a spouse, ancestors
and lineal descendants of the inventor, as well as any corporation
in which the inventor directly or indirectly owns more than 25%
in value of the outstanding stock. Sec. 1239 of the 1954 Code
positively prohibits allowance of capital gain in any sale or ex-
change, directly or indirectly, of depreciable property between
a husband and wife or between an individual and a corporation
in which he, his spouse, his minor children and minor grand-
children own more than 80% in value of the outstanding stock.
Taking Secs. 1235 and 1239 together, it appears that Con-
gress intended to make it extremely difficult for any transfer of
patents to a family corporation to qualify for capital gains under
present law. Nevertheless, there is the possibility that a trans-
fer to a "related" corporation which does not qualify under
Sec. 1235 may still produce capital gains if the inventor, his
spouse, his minor children and minor grandchildren own less
than 80% in value of the outstanding stock. Sec. 1239 does not
apply either if the inventor and his spouse own 79% and his
adult children own 21% in value of the outstanding stock. Other
possible combinations of family holdings which would steer
clear of Sec. 1239 and still produce capital gains could be sug-
gested. But, the purpose here is to point out a gap in the statu-
tory scheme which probably will require further legislation.
Non-Exclusive Statute
Sec. 1235 provides automatic capital gains treatment for
qualified transfers of patent rights. However, this does not pre-
vent capital gains from being recognized on transactions which
do not come within the statutory rules. Both the Commissioner
and the Courts have declared that Sec. 1235 is not exclusive and
was not intended by Congress to cover the entire field of capital
gains arising from the transfer of patent rights.17
The Commissioner has announced, in Revenue Ruling 58-353,
that capital gains may result from a transaction which does not
qualify for automatic capital gains because the transferee was a
"related person" within the meaning of Sec. 1235 or because
the transferor was not a qualified "holder," such as a cor-
17 Regulations Sec. 1.1235-1 (b), Sec. 1239, I. R. C., 1954; Rev. Ruling 58-
353 I. R. B. 1958-29, 15 (transactions not under Sec. 1235 will be governed
by general rules); Coplan 28 T. C. 1189 (1957); Johnson 30 T. C. 675
(1958). Acq. 1958-2 CB 6; Neugass (D. C. Okla., 1959) 59-1 USTC Par.
9310. See also: Rev. Ruling 59-210, 1. R. B. 1959-24, 13 which holds that
since patents used in a trade or business or held for production of income
are depreciable assets, Sec. 1239 forbids capital gain recognition on trans-
fer by inventor to 80% family-owned corp.
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poration. All necessary requirements must be met for a complete
transfer under the general rules of income tax law. That is, (1)
There will have to be a complete sale or disposition of all sub-
stantial rights of the transferor; (2) The property will have to
meet the statutory tests for qualifying as a capital asset rather
than inventory or property held for sale to customers in the
regular course of business; and (3) The asset will have to have
been held for six months or more before transfer.'8
The Tax Court has agreed with the Commissioner's inter-
pretation of Sec. 1235. In Best Lock Corp.1 9 and Holcomb20 the
Tax Court stated emphatically that Sec. 1235 provides only one
of the methods by which capital gains can be realized in the
patent field. Accordingly, where there was a definite sale in
every respect and no controversy as to the status of the patents
involved as capital assets, a charitable foundation and a donee
who did not qualify as "holders" within the meaning of Sec.
1235 were held to be entitled to capital gains treatment on patent
transfers.
These decisions do not conflict in any way with the pro-
visions of Sec. 1239, because the transferees were not 80%
family owned corporations. All attempts to claim capital gains on
transfers by an individual to related individuals, firms or cor-
porations are sure to be scrutinized by the Revenue Service to
check compliance with Secs. 1235 and 1239. Transfers by a
corporation to another corporation or to individuals may be
open to attack if there is any basis for suspecting lack of good
faith, even though no particular section of the Code deals ex-
pressly with this class of cases.
Settlement of Disputes
Compromise of actual or threatened litigation frequently
creates a dispute between the inventor and the Revenue Service
as to the taxable character of the settlement proceeds. For in-
stance, in Rose Marie Reid2" the Tax Court held that an agree-
ment settling differences which had arisen between the two
stockholders of a corporation formed to manufacture and sell
swimming suits resulted in capital gain to Mrs. Reid rather than
18 F. H. Philbrick, 27 T. C. 346 (1956), Acq. I. R. B. 1958-29, 6; Tobin
18 TCM 431 (2d Cir., 1959); Orla E. Watson v. U. S., 222 F. 2d 689 (10th
Cir. 1955) (discusses tests under prior law; same rules applicable now
where Sec. 1235 does not apply); E. A. Wolen v. U. S., 59-1 USTC Par. 9341
(D. C. Mass., 1959) pending in C. A. 1 on taxpayer's appeal (parties testi-
fied they did not originally intend complete assignment by a non-exclusive,
non-transferable, non-revocable right to use a patented process for im-
parting a protective color finish to the surface of ferrous metals; held not
a sale under prior law).
1V) Best Lock Co. 31 TC No. 125, C. C. H. Dec. No. 23, 508 (1959) (non-
exempt charitable foundation allowed capital gains).
20 Holcomb, 30 T. C. 354 (1958) (donee of patents can obtain capital gains
even though not a qualified holder under Sec. 1235)-appeals pending in
C. A. 6 by Gov't. and taxpayer.
21 26 TC 622 (1956) Acq. 1956-2 C. B. 8.
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compensation for personal services. The name of "Rose Marie
Reid" and certain patents she had obtained on swimming suits
for women were extremely valuable. The corporation using these
patents was one of the world's largest swim suit manufacturers
at the time Mrs. Reid threatened, through her legal counsel, to
enjoin it from using her name and to sue for recovery of patents
she claimed had been assigned without valid consideration and
under fraudulent conditions. To avoid such action, a substantial
settlement with Mrs. Reid gave Rose Marie, Inc. complete owner-
ship of the trade name and inventions in dispute. The Govern-
ment contended that payments under this contract were received
for personal services rendered rather than in consideration of
the final transfer of valuable property. However, the Tax Court
agreed with the taxpayer that she still possessed substantial
rights despite an earlier agreement purporting to transfer her
entire interest in the patents and trade names. The Court
pointed out that Mrs. Reid claimed the agreement was invalid
and had threatened to sue for relief; apparently counsel for the
company believed she had enough merits in her claims to jusify
the settlement. Consequently this was a final property transfer
whose proceeds were capital gains.
A different result in the Ost case 22 emphasizes the necessity
of awareness of tax consequences in drafting agreements per-
taining to patent rights. William R. Ost was the inventor of a
patented process for joining pipes, and threatened to sue his
present and former employers unless they compensated him for
his rights. A settlement agreement gave Mr. Ost a specified per-
centage of the net sales of devices manufactured under his pat-
ent, but provided that the amounts so payable were to be re-
duced by one-half if he ceased to be employed by the company
for which he was then working. On these facts and because he
continued to work at this employment throughout the entire
taxable period, it was found that only one-half of the total pay-
ments represented proceeds from the transfer of substantially all
of his rights to the invention. To avoid a similar result, em-
ployer-employee assignments and settlement agreements should
omit any provisions making the compensation to an employee
for patent rights contingent in whole or in part upon his con-
tinued employment. A separate employment contract would be
more advisable.
Intellectual Conceptions
An attempt was made in one recent case to circumvent the
statute excluding from capital gains treatment income from the
sale of a copyright, a literary, musical or artistic composition in
David Stern, III v. United States. 23 While in the Army during
22 17 TCM 80 (1958); Tygart Valley Glass Co., 16 T. C. 941 (1951) (no
showing of sale).
23 164 F. Supp. 847 (D. C., D. C., 1958) affd. 262 F. 2d 957; (5th Cir., 1959)
cert. den.
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World War II, Stern wrote some imaginary dialogue between a
Second Lieutenant and an old army mule, suggesting that there
was something in the Army lower than a Second Lieutenant.
After his discharge, Stern rewrote the episodes about "Francis,"
the talking mule, in book form and then sold all of his right, title
and interest in and to that character to Universal Pictures, Inc.
for $50,000.00 plus percentages on net profits from photoplays
or other uses of the property. Seven pictures about "Francis"
were produced, and Stern contended that his income was taxable
as capital gains.
Both the District Court and the Court of Appeals found in
favor of Stern for years prior to 1950, but judgment was entered
for the Government denying tax refunds for later years. It was
held that the statutory exclusions were controlling.
Stern's argument was that the character "Francis" was an
intellectual conception which was not subject to copyright and
that it was not a literary, musical or artistic composition or similar
property. But the District Court ruled that the principal char-
acter of the novel, "Francis" was composed of the literary de-
scription of his mannerisms and behavior. Without such de-
scription, there would be no property capable of ownership and
sale. The Court refused to accept the proposition that an idea
or mental image by itself could be sold independently from the
written material which gives it substance and a form capable of
being transferred to others. Parts of a literary composition as
well as an entire book, theatrical production, radio program,
TV script, newspaper cartoons or any other property eligible for
copyright protection are included in the terms of the new statute.
Capital gains cannot be realized by their creator from the sale of
any such items. 24
Options
Gains or losses arising from the exercise or failure to exer-
cise options to buy or sell patents are automatically classified by
Sec. 1234 of the Code as capital gains and losses if other require-
ments of the income tax laws are satisfied. This means that in
patent option cases capital gains or losses follow if the circum-
stances bring the deal under Sec. 1235 and do not violate Sec.
1239. Also capital gains and losses result from exercise or lapse
of options if the actual sale would have resulted in capital gains
or losses under the general rules previously discussed. Ob-
viously, options pertaining to copyrights or copyrightable works
qualify for capital gains or loss treatment only if the underlying
property is so classified. Secs. 1221 and 1231 (1) (c) prevent
authors, writers and composers from realizing capital gains on
options to sell their creations. Here is another instance of in-
come tax discrimination against work in the literary, musical and
artistic categories.
24 Sec. 1221 (3), and Sec. 1231 (c), I. R. C. 1954.
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Damages for Patent Infringement
Compensatory damages for patent infringements can be
spread back over the months in which the infringement occur-
red. Qualifying requirements under Sec. 1304 are somewhat
similar to, but much stricter than, those found in other long-
term income provisions. Meeting the 80% tests is one of the
lesser hurdles. Tax spreading for compensatory patent infringe-
ment damages is available only if such damages are received
after the commencement of litigation and applies only if the
patent was issued by the United States.2 5
Because of the positive language appearing in Sec. 1304, the
Treasury Regulations state that an out-of-court settlement be-
fore litigation is not covered, and that income spreading calcula-
tions cannot be used.2 6 Furthermore, it is specifically stated in
the Regulations that an out of court settlement even after starting
litigation will not qualify unless there is a decree or judgment
entered awarding the exact amount paid. Merely dismissing the
action at defendant's costs, with prejudice, would not comply with
the statute. Settling without litigation obviously would dis-
qualify the payment.
Damages for infringement of copyrights, registered trade-
names or trade-marks are not eligible for the same long-term in-
come benefits as compensatory damages for patent infringement.
The gist of the differences in their treatment is that tax liability
on patent infringement damages can be recomputed on the basis
of increases in taxable income which would have resulted if the
amount received were included in equal installments for each
month during which the infringement occurred. Copyright in-
fringement damages can be spread back only under Sec. 1302
for a period of not more than thirty-six months. No justification
for this distinction can be found in any inherent differences in
the nature of creative work in the various fields of intellectual
endeavor. Perhaps omission of copyright damages from Sec.
1304 was an oversight. Whether deliberate or accidental, it is one
of the many inequalities in the tax treatment of intellectual prop-
erty which should be remedied.
Long Term Income
Income from inventions and artistic works is given special
tax limitation benefits if the requirements under Sec. 1302 of the
1954 Code are fulfilled. It is possible also for professional in-
25 Special tax spreading provisions cover following types of long-term
income: (a) Sec. 1301, I. R. C., from employment; (b) Sec. 1302, I. R. C.,
from invention or artistic work; (c) Sec. 1303, I. R. C., from back pay; (d)
Sec. 1304, I. R. C., compensatory damages for breach of contract or of fidu-
ciary duty of $3,000 or more; (f) Sec. 1306, I. R. C. damages for anti-trust
law violations.
28 Sec. 1304, I. R. C.; Sec. 1.1304-1(b) (1) (IV) Regulations; Par. 4790 B,
Vol. 594, C. C. H. Standard Fed. Tax Serv.
(a) Sec. 1.1304-1(b) (1) (i), Regulations, supra;
(b) Sec. 1.1304-1(b) (1) (ii), (iii) and (iv), inclusive, Regulations.
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ventors, writers, musicians and artists, to obtain tax limitation
on lump sums received in a single year under Sec. 1301 as com-
pensation from an "employment." There is also some tax protec-
tion available for this group of creative people from Sec. 1303,
dealing with back pay, and Sec. 1305 which covers damages for
breach of contract in excess of $3,000.00.
The really important benefits for both amateurs and profes-
sionals are to be found in Sec. 1302 dealing with long-term in-
come and 1304 which relates to compensatory damages for patent
infringement. The basic purpose of these provisions of the Rev-
enue Code is to minimize the impact of high tax rates which
would otherwise result from "bunching" in the taxable income
of one year a lump sum which has been earned in or is otherwise
allocable to prior years. This is accomplished by limiting the
maximum amount of tax payable in the year of receipt to the
amount of taxes which would have been paid had the lump
sum been received over the years to which it is properly at-
tributable.27
Employment Compensation
Compensation from an "employment" qualifies for the
"spreadback" treatment if a taxpayer receives in one year at least
eighty percent of the total compensation from an employment
covering a period of more than thirty-six months. An "employ-
ment" is defined in Sec. 1301 (b) to mean an arrangement or
series of arrangements for the performance of personal services
to accomplish a particular result. The Courts agree with the
Commissioner that the services involved must relate to a partic-
ular project to be completed, rather than to compensation for
general services performed for a client or employer.25 Determi-
nation of the correct tax rates to be applied and whether a
specific amount received in a particular year qualifies under Sec.
1301 present problems outside the scope of this discussion. 29 It
is apparent, however, that wrongful damages for breach of an
employment contract or for the wrongful termination of a pro-
fessional relationship would not qualify as long term income
under Sec. 1301. It probably would be eligible for special tax
limitation benefits under either Sec. 1303, as back pay, or as
damages for breach of contract under Sec. 1305.
Lump sum income from work performed in developing in-
ventions, composing music, writing dialogue, etc. under an em-
ployment contract probably would qualify under Sec. 1301 if it
relates solely to a definite program or a special situation. Em-
27 Sec. 1.0301-1 of Commissioner's Regulations, Par. 4779, Vol. 594 C. C. H.
Standard Fed. Tax Reports.
28 Sec. 1.1301-2, Regulations, Reynolds v. Commr. 249 F. 2d 259 (4th Cir.
1957) (Salesman); Hoffman, et al. 11 T. C. 1057 (1948) (management com-
pensation); F. S. Ranz, 31 T. C. 91 (1958). See: Sec. 1.1301-2, Regulations,
Par. 4779A, Vol. 594 C. C. H. Standard Fed. Tax Serv.
29 Sec. 1307, I. R. C. 1954 sets out rules for tax computation.
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ployment to perform creative intellectual work at the general di-
rection of the employer probably would not be covered even if
it was confined to a special field such as development of new
drug chemicals, electronic devices, pumps, etc. or to programs
presented over the air by a particular performer.
Invention or Artistic Work
Long term income from an invention or artistic, literary and
musical work covering a period of twenty-four months from be-
ginning to completion is eligible for tax limitation under Sec.
1302. The qualifying requirement here is twenty-four months,
whereas it is thirty-six months for compensation from an em-
ployment under Sec. 1301. However, the requirement relating
to percentage of gross income received in a particular year is
the same in both sections; that is, a taxpayer qualifies by re-
ceiving in one year eighty percent of the entire amount.
Unlike the employment compensation rules in Sec. 1301,
which allow a lump sum received to be spread back over the
actual time in which it was earned, Sec. 1302 limits the "spread-
back period" to sixty months for inventions and thirty-six
months for an artistic work. Consequently, a taxpayer receiving
a lump sum equal to eighty percent of his total compensation
for a play, musical comedy or an artistic work which took him
six years to complete can only spread back his income over a
thirty-six month period.30 Even in allowing "spreadback" tax
limitations, Congress has granted inventions more favorable
treatment than copyrights and similar property.
Certain other technical features of this portion of the Code
must be observed carefully. For instance, in the case of com-
pensation from long term employment, special tax benefits are
available if the amount received in any one year equals eighty
percent of the total compensation.3 1 But Sec. 1302 requires that
sums received in one year from an invention or artistic work
must be added to those received in prior years, plus any amount
received in the twelve months immediately following the close
of the taxable year.32 Also, the term "invention" is limited to a
"patent covering an invention by an individual." Therefore, in-
come from scientific processes, chemical formulae and mechanical
devices which have not yet been patented or cannot be patented
30 Sec. 1302, (a) (3), 1. R. C. 1954.
31 Sec. 1.1302-1, Regulations, Par. 4785, Vol. 594 C. C. H. Standard Fed.
Tax Serv.
32 Difficulties encountered in applying Sec. 1302 because of time when
income was actually received may be resolved by invoking doctrine of
constructive receipt. James Gould Cozzens, 19 T. C. 663 (1953) (Royalties
not constructively received in prior year because they were not then sub-ject to author's unqualified right of demand and use). Compare: McEuen
v. Commissioner, 196 F. 2d 127 (8th Cir. 1952), 521 U. S. T. C. Par. 9281,
where it was found that payment was constructively received in the year
when it was freely available.
13Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1960
TAXES ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
are excluded from any special tax spreading benefits. Income
from sale of pending applications also does not qualify. Finally,
income treated as capital gains to inventors, artists, writers and
musicians does not qualify.
When Work Begins
An author, composer or inventor sometimes carries ideas
around in his mind for a long time before he puts down a single
word on paper, writes a note of music or draws a sketch of his
invention. Even after he makes a start, months or years of re-
search and experiments may elapse before actual completion of
the work.
Does the time spent in thinking or in research count as part
of the period of twenty-four months from beginning to comple-
tion of the work which Sec. 1302 fixes as a prerequisite to quali-
fication for tax-spreading benefits? There is no statutory defini-
tion of the amount of work required or the nature, kind or ex-
tent of activity which must be proven to show commencement
of the twenty-four month work period.
In the case of I. D. Richardson,33 the Tax Court ruled that
work began on a book of war memoirs on the date when the
author first made written notes of his experiences. The evidence
showed a persistent intention on the part of Richardson to write
this book; therefore, the Court rejected the government's con-
tention that time spent in collecting and preparing material
which was not included in the final version of the book should
be omitted in computing the statutory work period. Richardson
testified that he had prepared two previous versions of the book
and had accumulated voluminous notes which had been lost on
two different occasions through enemy action and shipwreck. On
these facts, it was held that time spent in preparing lost and dis-
carded written material should be included as part of the total
time spent on the entire endeavor.
Sec. 1302 was intended as a relief statute, but later decisions
have adhered to the rule in the Richardson case. Although the
Tax Court again held that the work period begins with the date
of the first written memorandum, its decision in the Blum case34
indicates that no particular amount of continuous activity in
writing a manuscript or typing notes is required to maintain a
creative work status throughout the entire twenty-four month
period.
Nearly five years elapsed from the time when Blum first con-
ceived the idea until he sold a motion picture play about a goddess
who became a living person and fell in love with a Broadway
character whom she could not marry because he was a mortal.
During this period, Blum did little writing or typing on his story.
33 Iliff David Richardson 14 T. C. 547 (1950).
34 Edwin H. Blum 11 T. C. M. 612, Tax Court Memo. Op., Docket No.
25711 (1952).
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The bulk of his work consisted of research for background ma-
terial and discussing his idea about a supernatural story with
other writers. After selling the story to Columbia Pictures Cor-
poration for $25,000.00, he claimed the right to distribute this in-
come on a long-term basis extending back from the date of sale.
A year after the sale, he made an affidavit in defense of a pro-
posed plagarism suit that a written note of an idea he had picked
up while reading a magazine was made about five years before
selling his story and that it was recorded in a notebook which
he had kept specifically for such purpose. Stirred by this idea,
he did considerable research on Greek mythology, all of which
he claimed influenced him in working out the final story. The
Tax Court agreed that the required number of calendar months
was covered by the taxpayer's work. In its opinion, the Court
commented that:
"In applying the intent of the statute to work entailed in
writing a dramatic composition, it would be sophistic if we
were to separate the work into (a) physical labor, such as
typing, and (b) mental labor, and to hold that (a) should be
counted as work on the project but that (b) should not.
The construction of a plot, the development of the characters
and the crystallization of the story theme into terms of con-
flict, suspense and final resolution are the results of mental
activity. In terms of essentiality, the mental activity is more
important than the physical work of writing or typing."
While finding in favor of the taxpayer on the question of
qualification for long term benefits, the Tax Court disagreed
with his contention that the required number of months should
be dated backward from the date on which the story was sold.
Following the decision of the Supreme Court in Robertson v.
United States,3 5 the Court required Blum to allocate the gain re-
ceived from sale of his story over a period of months preceding
the close of the taxable year, even though the sale occurred in
September. It is significant that the months in the taxable year
subsequent to receipt of the income cannot be excluded in a
computation under Sec. 1302.
Another illustration of the strict construction of the term
"work" is to be found in Beardsley v. United States,3 6 a case aris-
ing under the prior law when a thirty-six months qualifying
period was imposed. There, the first reduction to writing or draw-
ing, pertaining to an invention of an air flow fuel economizer
for aircraft engines, occurred thirty-five and one-half months be-
fore the date of filing a patent application. But, the taxpayer
testified that the idea for his invention came to him at least six
months before that date and that he thought it over continuously
until he made his first written notation.
35 52-1 U. S. T. C. 9343, affg. 190 F. 2d 680 (U. S. 1952).
36 56-U. S. T. C. 9374 (1956)
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Beardsley claimed the benefit of long-term income tax relief,
but his action for refund was decided in favor of the Government.
The District Court stated that petitioner did nothing more than
carry the idea in the back of his mind from November of one
year until April of the following year when he made his first
drawing. Even though he kept looking at data in this field in the
course of his regular work as an engineer, there had been no
commencement of "work" in the statutory sense. Furthermore,
eleven years before the trial of the tax refund suit, Beardsley had
testified in a patent infringement suit that he began actively
exercising reasonable diligence in adapting and perfecting his in-
vention during the April period.
The Beardsley decision is important because it defines
"work," as used in this statute, to mean:
"something more than the germinating of the idea and mental
notice taking of passing data prior to the demonstrable de-
cision to take affirmative action to perfect the idea."
In 1957, the Tax Court held that even if it were assumed,
contrary to the Beardsley3 and Richardson" cases, that work on
a meat curing invention began when the idea was first conceived,
less than thirty-six months had elapsed to completion. The date
on which a patent application was filed embodying the complete
process or device was fixed as the completion date. The taxpayer
claimed that the development work carried on during the next
two years should be included.39 But, the Court ruled that this
effort was directed solely toward commercial development of the
process, but no work was being done on the patent covering the
invention. In this case, there was no change in the patent ap-
plication after the first filing date. A different conclusion prob-
ably would be reached where the patent application itself was
modified and revised while pending in the Patent Office, especially
if the process or device described is improved by such additional
work.
Tax Discrimination
It is clear from Sec. 1302, that inventors have at least twice
as many tax relief opportunities as composers, authors and mu-
sicians. If they do not come under Sec. 1235, inventors still may
acquire capital gains in the regular way. Even when capital
gains are lost entirely, long-term income tax relief is available for
inventors under Sec. 1302. Literary, musical and artistic talent
cannot acquire similar capital gains, and only Sec. 1302 provides
them with protection against unduly harsh tax burdens.
37 Supra, note 36.
38 Supra, note 33.
39 Murray T. Morgan, 16 T. C. M. 262, Docket No. 59208 (1957). While
the Richardson, Blum and Morgan cases involved Sec. 107(b) of the 1939
Code, the same basic principles are applicable to the interpretation of Sec.
1302 of the Revenue Code of 1954.
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Authors, composers and artists have many of the same fi-
nancial and creative problems as inventors. Yet, Congress has
perpetuated an inequality in their treatment under the income
tax laws. It seems absurd that a scientist can report the pro-
ceeds from the sale of a new invention, patentable process, form-
ula, etc. as long-term capital gains, but that he would be subject
to ordinary income tax rates if he sold the rights to a book de-
scribing this very same work.
Conclusion
There should be a uniform allowance of long-term capital
gains, or else the tax relief for patents, copyrights and copy-
rightable works should be restricted entirely to "spread-backs"
similar to those now permitted by Sec. 1302. The actual time
elapsed from commencement to completion of the work should
be used as the limits of the recomputation period, rather than
some arbitrary period such as thirty-six or sixty months. Con-
sistency in this field also calls for elimination of existing dis-
tinctions between the treatment of compensatory damages for
patent infringement and those for infringement of copyrights,
trademarks and trade-names.
NOTE: Tax problems arising from litigation, settlements and application
of long-term tax limitation statutes are discussed in more detail by the
author in his article on "Taxation of Damages," Fall Issue, 1959, Univ. of
Pittsburgh L. R. See also, Kennett, Tax Aspects of Jury Valuation of Fu-
ture Earnings, 6 Clev-Mar. L. R. 282 (1957).
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